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Abstract. A characterization of predicate encryption (PE) with support for homomorphic operations
is presented and we describe the homomorphic properties of some existing PE constructions. Even for
the special case of IBE, there are few known group-homomorphic cryptosystems. Our main construction
is an XOR-homomorphic IBE scheme based on the quadratic residuosity problem (variant of the Cocks’
scheme), which we show to be strongly homomorphic. We were unable to construct an anonymous
variant that preserves this homomorphic property, but we achieved anonymity for a weaker notion
of homomorphic encryption, which we call non-universal. A related security notion for this weaker
primitive is formalized. Finally, some potential applications and open problems are considered.
1 Introduction
There has been much interest recently in encryption schemes with homomorphic capabilities. Traditionally,
malleability was avoided to satisfy strong security definitions, but many applications have been identified
for cryptosystems supporting homomorphic operations. More recently, Gentry [1] presented the first fully-
homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme, and several improvements and variants have since appeared in the
literature [2–5]. There are however many applications that only require a scheme to support a single homo-
morphic operation. Such schemes are referred to as partial homomorphic. Notable examples of unbounded
homomorphic cryptosystems include Goldwasser-Micali [6] (XOR), Paillier [7] and ElGamal [8].
Predicate Encryption (PE) [9] enables a sender to embed a hidden descriptor within a ciphertext that
consists of attributes describing the message content. A Trusted Authority (TA) who manages the system
issues secret keys to users corresponding to predicates. A user can decrypt a ciphertext containing a descriptor
a if and only if he/she has a secret key for a predicate that evaluates to true for a. This construct turns
out to be quite powerful, and generalizes many encryption primitives. It facilitates expressive fine-grained
access control i.e. complex policies can be defined restricting the recipients who can decrypt a message. It
also facilitates the evaluation of complex queries on data such as range, subset and search queries. Extending
the class of supported predicates for known schemes is a topic of active research at present.
PE can be viewed in two ways. It can be viewed as a means to delegate computation to a third party
i.e. allow the third party to perform a precise fixed function on the encrypted data, and thus limit what
the third party learns about the data. In the spirit of this viewpoint, a generalization known as Functional
Encryption has been proposed [10], which allows general functions to be evaluated.
PE can also be viewed as a means to achieve more fine-grained access control. It enables a stronger
separation between sender and recipient since the former must only describe the content of the message or
more general conditions on its access while decryption then depends on whether a recipient’s access policy
matches these conditions.
Why consider homomorphic encryption in the PE setting? It is conceivable that in a multi-user envi-
ronment such as a large organization, certain computations may be delegated to the cloud whose inputs
depend on the work of multiple users distributed within that organization. Depending on the application,
the circuit to be computed may be chosen or adapted by the cloud provider, and thus is not fixed by the
delegator as in primitives such as non-interactive verifiable computing [11]. Furthermore, the computation
may depend on data sets provided by multiple independent users. Since the data is potentially sensitive, the
organization’s security policy may dictate that all data must be encrypted. Accordingly, each user encrypts
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her data with a PE scheme using relevant attributes to describe it. She then sends the ciphertext(s) to the
cloud. It is desirable that the results of the computation returned from the cloud be decryptable only by an
entity whose access policy (predicate) satisfies the attributes of all data sets used in the computation. Of
course a public-key homomorphic scheme together with a PE scheme would be sufficient if the senders were
able to interact before contacting the cloud, but we would like to remove this requirement since the senders
may not be aware of each other. This brings to mind the recent notion of multikey homomorphic encryption
presented by Lo´pez-Alt, Tromer and Vaikuntanathan [12].
Using a multikey homomorphic scheme, the senders need not interact with each other before evaluation
takes place on the cloud. Instead, they must run an MPC decryption protocol to jointly decrypt the result
produced by the cloud. The evaluated ciphertexts in the scheme described in [12] do not depend on the circuit
size, and depend only polynomially on the security parameter and the number of parties who contribute
inputs to the circuit. Therefore, the problem outlined above may be solved with a multikey fully homomorphic
scheme used in conjunction with a PE scheme if we accept the evaluated ciphertext size to be polynomial
in the number of parties. In this work, we are concerned with a ciphertext size that is independent of the
number of parties. Naturally, this limits the composition of access policies, but if this is acceptable in an
application, there may be efficiency gains over the combination of multikey FHE and PE.
In summary, homomorphic encryption in the PE setting is desirable if there is the possibility of multiple
parties in a large organization (say) sending encrypted data to a semi-trusted ∗ evaluator and access poli-
cies are required to appropriately limit access to the results, where the “composition” of access policies is
“lossy”. We assume the semi-honest model in this paper; in particular we do not consider verifiability of the
computation.
The state of affairs for homomorphic encryption even for the simplest special case of PE, namely identity-
based encryption (IBE), leaves open many challenges. At his talk at Crypto 2010, Naccache [13] mentioned
“identity-based fully homomorphic encryption” as one of a list of theory questions. Towards this goal, it has
been pointed out in [14] that some LWE-based FHE constructions can be modified to obtain a weak form of an
identity-based FHE scheme using the trapdoor functions from [15]; that is, additional information is needed
(beyond what can be non-interactively derived from a user’s identity) in order to evaluate certain circuits
and to perform bootstrapping. Therefore, the valued non-interactivity property of IBE is lost whereby no
communication between encryptors and the TA is needed. To the best of our knowledge, fully-homomorphic
or even “somewhat-homomorphic” IBE remains open, and a variant of the BGN-type scheme of Gentry,
Halevi and Vaikuntanathan [16] is the only IBE scheme that can compactly evaluate quadratic formulae
(supports 2-DNF).
As far as the authors are aware, there are no (ZN ,+) (like Paillier) or (Z
∗
p, ∗) (like ElGamal) homomorphic
IBE schemes. Many pairings-based IBE constructions admit multiplicative homomorphisms which give us
a limited additive homomorphism for small ranges; that is, a discrete logarithm problem must be solved to
recover the plaintext, and the complexity thereof is O(
√
M), where M is the size of the message space. Of a
similar variety are public-key schemes such as BGN [17] and Benaloh [18]. It remains open to construct an
unbounded additively homomorphic IBE scheme for a “large” range such as Paillier [7]. Possibly a fruitful
step in this direction would be to look at Galbraith’s variant of Paillier’s cryptosystem based on elliptic
curves over rings [19].
One of the contributions of this paper is to construct an additively homomorphic IBE scheme for Z2,
which is usually referred to as XOR-homomorphic. XOR-homomorphic schemes such as Goldwasser-Micali [6]
have been used in many practical applications including sealed-bid auctions, biometric authentication and
as the building blocks of protocols such as private information retrieval, and it seems that an IBE XOR-
homomorphic scheme may be useful in some of these scenarios.
We faced barriers however trying to make our XOR-homomorphic scheme anonymous. The main obstacle
is that the homomorphism depends on the public key. We pose as an open problem the task of constructing
a variant that achieves anonymity and retains the homomorphic property. Inheriting the terminology of
Golle et al. [20] (who refer to re-encryption without the public key as universal re-encryption), we designate
homomorphic evaluation in a scheme that does not require knowledge of the public key as universal. We
introduce a weaker primitive that explicitly requires additional information to be passed to the homomorphic
evaluation algorithm. Our construction can be made anonymous and retain its homomorphic property in this
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context; that is, if the attribute (identity in the case of IBE) is known to an evaluator. While this certainly
is not ideal, it may be plausible in some scenarios that an evaluator is allowed to be privy to the attribute(s)
encrypted by the ciphertexts, and it is other parties in the system to whom the attribute(s) must remain
concealed. An adversary sees incoming and outgoing ciphertexts, and can potentially request evaluations
on arbitrary ciphertexts. We call such a variant non-universal. We propose a syntax for a non-universal
homomorphic primitive and formulate a security notion to capture attribute-privacy in this context.
1.1 Related Work
There have been several endeavors to characterize homomorphic encryption schemes. Gjøsteen [21] succeeded
in characterizing many well-known group homomorphic cryptosystems by means of an abstract construc-
tion whose security rests on the hardness of a subgroup membership problem. More recently, Armknecht,
Katzenbeisser and Peter [22] gave a more complete characterization and generalized Gjøsteen’s results to the
IND-CCA1 setting. However, in this work, our focus is at a higher level and not concerned with the under-
lying algebraic structures. In particular, we do not require the homomorphisms to be unbounded since our
aim to provide a more general characterization for homomorphic encryption in the PE setting. Compactness,
however, is required; that is, informally, the length of an evaluated ciphertext should be independent of the
size of the computation.
The notion of receiver-anonymity or key-privacy was formally established by Bellare et al. [23], and the
concept of universal anonymity (any user can anonymize a ciphertext) was proposed in [24]. The first univer-
sally anonymous IBE scheme appeared in [25]. Prabhakaran and Rosulek [26] consider receiver-anonymity
for their definitions of homomorphic encryption.
Finally, since Cocks’ IBE scheme [27] appeared, variants have been proposed ( [28] and [25]) that achieve
anonymity and improve space efficiency. However, the possibility of constructing a homomorphic variant has
not received attention to date.
1.2 Organization
Notation and background definitions are set out in Section 2. Our characterization of homomorphic predicate
encryption is specified in Section 3; the syntax, correctness conditions and security notions are established,
and the properties of such schemes are analyzed. In Section 4, some instantiations are given based on
inner-product PE constructions. Our main construction, XOR-homomorphic IBE, is presented in Section 5.
Non-universal homomorphic encryption and the abstraction of universal anonymizers is presented in Section
6 towards realizing anonymity for our construction in a weaker setting. Conclusions and future work are
presented in Section 7.
2 Preliminaries
A quantity is said to be negligible with respect to some parameter λ, written negl(λ), if it is asymptotically
bounded from above by the reciprocal of all polynomials in λ.
For a probability distribution D, we denote by x
$←− D that x is sampled according to D. If S is a set,
y
$←− S denotes that y is sampled from x according to the uniform distribution on S.
The support of a predicate f : A → {0, 1} for some domain A is denoted by supp(f), and is defined by
the set {a ∈ A : f(a) = 1}.
Definition 1 (Homomorphic Encryption). A homomorphic encryption scheme with message space M
supporting a class of ℓ-input circuits C ⊆ M ℓ → M is a tuple of PPT algorithms (Gen,Enc,Dec,Eval)
satisfying the property:
∀(pk, sk)← Gen(1λ), ∀C ∈ C, ∀m1, . . . ,mℓ ∈M
∀c1, . . . , cℓ ← Enc(pk,m1), . . . ,Enc(pk,mℓ)
C(m1, . . . ,mℓ) = Dec(sk,Eval(pk, C, ci, . . . , cℓ))
The following definition is based on [29],
Definition 2 (Strongly Homomorphic). Let E be a homomorphic encryption scheme with message space
M and class of supported circuits C ⊆ {M ℓ → M}. E is said to be strongly homomorphic iff ∀C ∈
C, ∀(pk, sk) ← Gen, ∀m1, . . . ,mℓ, ∀c1, . . . , cℓ ← Enc(pk,m1), . . . ,Enc(pk,mℓ), the following distributions
are statistically indistinguishable
Enc(pk, C(m1, . . . ,mℓ)) ≈ (Eval(pk, C, c1, . . . , cℓ).
Definition 3 (Predicate Encryption (Adapted from [9] Definition 1)). A predicate encryption (PE)
scheme for the class of predicates F over the set of attributes A and with message space M consists of four
algorithms Setup, GenKey, Encrypt, Decrypt such that:
− PE.Setup takes as input the security parameter 1λ and outputs public parameters PP and master secret
key MSK.
− PE.GenKey takes as input the master secret key MSK and a description of a predicate f ∈ F . It outputs
a key SKf .
− PE.Encrypt takes as input the public parameters PP, a message m ∈M and an attribute a ∈ A. It returns
a ciphertext c. We write this as c← Encrypt(PP, a,m).
− PE.Decrypt takes as input a secret key SKf for a predicate f and a ciphertext c. It outputs m iff f(a) = 1.
Otherwise it outputs a distinguished symbol ⊥ with all but negligible probability.
Remark 1. Predicate Encryption (PE) is known by various terms in the literature. PE stems from Attribute-
Based Encryption (ABE) with Key Policy, or simply KP-ABE, and differs from it in its support for attribute
privacy. As a result, “ordinary” KP-ABE is sometimes known as PE with public index. Another variant of
ABE is CP-ABE (ciphertext policy) where the encryptor embeds her access policy in the ciphertext and a
recipient must possess sufficient attributes in order to decrypt. This is the reverse of KP-ABE. In this paper,
the emphasis is placed on PE with its more standard interpretation, namely KP-ABE with attribute privacy.
3 Homomorphic Predicate Encryption
3.1 Syntax
LetM be as message space and let A be a set of attributes. Consider a set of operations ΓM ⊆ {M2 →M} on
the message space, and a set of operations ΓA ⊆ {A2 → A} on the attribute space. We denote by γ = γA×γM
for some γA ∈ ΓA and γM ∈ ΓM the operation (A × M)2 → (A ×M) given by γ((a1,m1), (a2,m2)) =
(γA(a1, a2), γM (m1,m2)). Accordingly, we define the set of permissible “gates” Γ ⊆ {γA × γM : γA ∈
ΓA, γM ∈ ΓM} ⊆ {(A ×M)2 → (A ×M)}†. Thus, each operation on the plaintexts is associated with a
single (potentially distinct) operation on the attributes. Finally, we can specify a class of permissible circuits
C built from Γ .
Definition 4. A homomorphic predicate encryption (HPE) scheme for the non-empty class of predicates F ,
message space M , attribute space A, and class of ℓ-input circuits C consists of a tuple of five PPT algorithms
Setup, GenKey, Encrypt,Decrypt and Eval. such that:
− HPE.Setup, HPE.GenKey, HPE.Encrypt and HPE.Decrypt are as specified in Definition 3.
− HPE.Eval(PP, C, c1, . . . , cℓ) takes as input the public parameters PP, an ℓ-input circuit C ∈ C, and
ciphertexts c1 ← HPE.Encrypt(PP, a1,m1), . . . , cℓ ← HPE.Encrypt(PP, aℓ,mℓ).
It outputs a ciphertext that encrypts the attribute-message pair C((a1,m1), . . . , (aℓ,mℓ)).
Accordingly, the correctness criteria are defined as follows:
Correctness conditions:
For any (PP,MSK)← HPE.Setup(1λ), f ∈ F , SKf ← HPE.GenKey(PP,MSK, f), C ∈ C:
1. For any a ∈ A,m ∈M, c← HPE.Encrypt(PP,m, a):
HPE.Decrypt(SKf , c) = m ⇐⇒ f(a) = 1
†It is assumed that ΓA and ΓM are minimal insofar as ∀γA ∈ ΓA∃γM ∈ ΓM s.t. γA × γM ∈ Γ and the converse
also holds. In particular, we later assume this of ΓA.
2. ∀m1, . . . ,mℓ ∈M, ∀a1, . . . , aℓ ∈ A, ∀c1, . . . , cℓ ← HPE.Encrypt(PP, a1,m1), . . . ,HPE.Encrypt(PP, aℓ,mℓ) :
∀c′ ← HPE.Eval(PP, C, c1, . . . , cℓ)
(a)
HPE.Decrypt(SKf , c
′) = m′ ⇐⇒ f(a′) = 1
where (m′, a′) = C((a1,m1), . . . , (aℓ,mℓ))
(b)
|c′| < L(λ)
where L(λ) is a fixed polynomial derivable from PP.
The special case of “predicate only” encryption [9] that excludes plaintexts (“payloads”) is modelled by
setting M , {0} for a distinguished symbol 0, and setting Γ , {γA × idM : γA ∈ ΓA} where idM is the
identity operation on M .
3.2 Security Notions
The security notions we consider carry over from the standard notions for PE. The basic requirement is
IND-CPA security, which is referred to as “payload-hiding”. A stronger notion is “attribute-hiding” that
additionally entails indistinguishability of attributes. The definitions are game-based with non-adaptive and
adaptive variants. The former prescribes that the adversary choose its target attributes at the beginning of
the game before seeing the public parameters, whereas the latter allows the adversary’s choice to be informed
by the public parameters and secret key queries.
Definition 5. A (H)PE scheme E is said to be (fully) attribute-hiding (based on Definition 2 in [9]) if an
adversary A has negligible advantage in the following game:
1. In the non-adaptive variant, A outputs two attributes a0 and a1 at the beginning of the game.
2. The challenger C runs Setup(1λ) and outputs (PP,MSK)
3. Phase 1
A makes adaptive queries for the secret keys for predicates f1, . . . , fk ∈ F subject to the constraint that
fi(a0) = fi(a1) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
4. Remark 2. In the stronger adaptive variant, A only chooses attributes a0 and a1 at this stage.
5. A outputs two messages m0 and m1 of equal length. It must hold that m0 = m1 if there is an i such that
fi(a0) = fi(a1) = 1.
6. C chooses a random bit b, and outputs c← Encrypt(PP, ab,mb)
7. Phase 2
A second phase is run where A requests secret keys for other predicates subject to the same constraint as
above.
8. Finally, A outputs a guess b′ and is said to win if b′ = b.
A weaker property referred to as weakly attribute-hiding [9] requires that the adversary only request keys
for predicates f obeying f(a0) = f(a1) = 0.
We propose another model of security for non-universal homomorphic encryption in Section 6.
3.3 Attribute Operations
We now characterize HPE schemes based on the properties of their attribute operations (elements of ΓA).
Definition 6 (Properties of attribute operations). ∀f ∈ F , ∀a1, a2 ∈ A, ∀γA ∈ ΓA:
1.
f(γA(a1, a2))⇒ f(a1) ∧ f(a2) (3.1)
(Necessary condition for IND-CPA security)
2.
f(γA(a1, a1)) = f(a1) (3.2)
3. ∀d ∈ A:
f(a1) = f(a2)⇒ f(γA(d, a1)) = f(γA(d, a2))
∧ f(γA(a1, d)) = f(γA(a2, d))
(3.3)
(Non-monotone Indistinguishability)
4.
f(γA(a1, a2)) = f(a1) ∧ f(a2) (3.4)
(Monotone Access)
Property 3.1 is a minimal precondition for payload-hiding i.e. IND-CPA security under both adaptive
and non-adaptive security definitions.
Property 3.2 preserves access under a homomorphic operation on ciphertexts with the same attribute.
Property 3.3 is a necessary condition for full attribute-hiding.
Property 3.4 enables monotone access; a user only learns a function of a plaintext if and only if that user
has permission to learn the value of that plaintext. This implies that (A, γA) cannot be a group unless F is
a class of constant predicates. In general, 3.4 implies that F is monotonic. Monotone access is equivalent to
the preceding three properties collectively; that is
3.1 ∧ 3.2 ∧ 3.3 ⇐⇒ 3.4
Non-Monotone Access Non-monotone access is trickier to define and to suitably accommodate in a secu-
rity definition. It can arise from policies that involve negation. As an example, suppose that it is permissible
for a party to decrypt data sets designated as either “geology” or “aviation”, but is not authorized to decrypt
results with both designations that arise from homomorphic computations on both data sets. Of course it
is then necessary to strengthen the restrictions on the adversary’s choice of a0 and a1 in the security game.
Let a0 and a1 be the attributes chosen by the adversary. Intuitively, the goal is to show that any sequence
of transitions that leads a0 to a an element outside the support of f , also leads a1 to an element outside the
support of f , and vice versa. Instead of explicitly imposing this non-triviality constraint on the adversary’s
choice of attributes, one may seek to show that there is no pair of attributes distinguishable under any γA and
f ∈ F . This is captured by the property of non-monotone indistinguishability (3.3). Trivially, the constant
operations satisfy 3.3. Of more interest is an operation that limits homomorphic operations to ciphertexts
with the same attribute. This captures our usual requirements for the (anonymous) IBE functionality, but
it is also satisfactory for many applications of general PE where computation need only be performed on
ciphertexts with matching attributes. To accomplish this, the attribute space is augmented with a (logical)
absorbing element z such that f(z) = 0 ∀f ∈ F . The attribute operation is defined as follows:
δ(a1, a2) =
{
a1 if a1 = a2
z if a1 6= a2
(3.5)
δ models the inability to perform homomorphic evaluations on ciphertexts associated with unequal attributes
(identities in the case of IBE). A scheme with this operation can only be fully attribute-hiding in a vacuous
sense (it may be such that no restrictions are placed upon the adversary’s choice of f but it is unable
to find attributes a0 and a1 satisfying f(a0) = f(a1) = 1 for any f .) This is the case for anonymous
IBE where the predicates are equality relations, and for the constant map (a1, a2) 7→ z that models the
absence of a homomorphic property, although this is preferably modeled by appropriately constraining the
class of permissible circuits. More generally, such schemes can only be weakly attribute-hiding because their
operations γA only satisfy a relaxation of 3.3 given as follows:
Necessary condition for weakly attribute-hiding ∀a1, a2, d ∈ A:
f(a1) = f(a2) = 0⇒ f(γA(d, a1)) = f(γA(d, a2))
∧ f(γA(a1, d)) = f(γA(a2, d))
(3.6)
Remark 3. In the case of general schemes not satisfying 3.3, placing constraints on the adversary’s choice of
attributes weakens the security definition. Furthermore, it must be possible for the challenger to efficiently
check whether a pair of attributes satisfies such a condition. Given the added complications, it is tempting
to move to a simulation-based definition of security. However, this is precluded by the recent impossibility
results of [30] in the case of both weakly and fully attribute-hiding in the NA/AD-SIM models of security.
However, for predicate encryption with public index (the attribute is not hidden), this has not been ruled
out for 1-AD-SIM and many-NA-SIM where “1” and “many” refer to the number of ciphertexts seen by the
adversary. See [30,31] for more details. In the context of non-monotone access, it thus seems more reasonable
to focus on predicate encryption with public index. Our main focus in this work is on schemes that facilitate
attribute privacy, and therefore we restrict our attention to schemes that at least satisfy 3.6.
Delegate Predicate Encryption A primitive presented in [32] called “Delegate Predicate Encryption”
(DPE) ‡ enables a user to generate an encryption key associated with a chosen attribute a ∈ A, which does
not reveal anything about a. The user can distribute this to certain parties who can then encrypt messages
with attribute a obliviously. The realization in [32] is similar to the widely-used technique of publishing
encryptions of “zero” in a homomorphic cryptosystem, which can then be treated as a key. In fact, this
technique is adopted in [33] to transform a strongly homomorphic private-key scheme into a public-key one.
Generalizing from the results of [32], this corollary follows from the property of attribute-hiding
Corollary 1. An attribute-hiding HPE scheme is a DPE as defined in [32] if there exists a γ ∈ Γ such that
(A×M,γ) is unital.
4 Constructions with Attribute Aggregation
In this section, we give some meaningful examples of attribute homomorphisms (all which satisfy monotone
access) for some known primitives. We begin with a special case of PE introduced by Boneh and Waters [34],
which they call Hidden Vector Encryption. In this primitive, a ciphertext embeds a vector w ∈ {0, 1}n where
n is fixed in the public parameters. On the other hand, a secret key corresponds to a vector v ∈ V , {∗, 0, 1}n
where ∗ is interpreted as a “wildcard” symbol or a “don’t care” (it matches any symbol). A decryptor who
has a secret key for some v can check whether it matches the attribute in a ciphertext.
To formulate in terms of PE, let A = {0, 1}n and define
F ⊆ {(w1, . . . , wn) 7→
n∧
i=1
(vi = wi ∨ vi = ∗) : v ∈ V }
Unfortunately, we cannot achieve a non-trivial homomorphic variant of HVE that satisfies 3.4. To see
this, consider the HVE class of predicates F and an operation γA satisfying 3.4. For any x,y ∈ A, let
z = γA(x,y). Now for 3.4 to hold, we must have that f(z) = f(x) ∧ f(y) for all f ∈ F . Suppose xi 6= yi
and zi = xi. Then there exists an f ∈ F with f(z) = f(x) and f(z) 6= f(y). It is necessary to restrict V .
Accordingly, let V = {∗, 1}n Setting the non-equal elements to 0 yields associativity and commutativity.
Such an operation is equivalent to component-wise logical AND on the attribute vectors, and we will denote
it by ∧n. (A,∧n) is a semilattice.
Recall that a predicate-only scheme does not incorporate a payload into ciphertexts. Even such a scheme
E with the ∧n attribute homomorphism might find some purpose in real-world scenarios. One particular
application of E is secure data aggregation in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), an area which has been
the target of considerable research (a good survey is [35]). It is conceivable that some aggregator nodes may
be authorized by the sink (base station to which packets are forwarded) to read packets matching certain
criteria. An origin sensor node produces an outgoing ciphertext as follows: (1). It encrypts the attributes
describing its data using E . (2) It encrypts its sensor reading with the public key of the sink using a separate
additively (say) homomorphic public-key cryptosystem. (3) Both ciphertexts are forwarded to the next hop.
Since an aggregator node receives packets from multiple sources, it needs to have some knowledge about
how to aggregate them. To this end, the sink can authorize it to apply a particular predicate to incoming
‡Not to be confused with the different notion of Delegatable Predicate Encryption.
ciphertexts to check for matching candidates for aggregation. One sample policy may be [“REGION1” ∧
“TEMPERATURE”’]. It can then aggregate ciphertexts matching this policy. Additional aggregation can
be performed by a node further along the route that has been perhaps issued a secret key for a predicate
corresponding to the more permissive policy of [“TEMPERATURE”]. In the scenario above, it would be
more ideal if E were also additively homomorphic since besides obviating the need to use another PKE
cryptosystem, more control is afforded to aggregators; they receive the ability to decrypt partial sums, and
therefore, to perform (more involved) statistical computations on the data.
It is possible to achieve the former case from some recent inner-product PE schemes that admit homomor-
phisms on both attributes and payload. We focus on two prominent constructions with different mathematical
structures. Firstly, a construction is examined by Katz, Sahai and Waters (KSW) [9], which relies on non-
standard assumptions on bilinear groups, assumptions that are justified by the authors in the generic group
model. Secondly, we focus on a construction presented by Agrawal, Freeman and Vaikuntanathan (AFV) [36]
whose security is based on the learning with errors (LWE) problem.
In both schemes, an attribute is an element of Znm
§ and a predicate also corresponds to an element of
Znm. For v ∈ Znm, a predicate fv : Znm → {0, 1} is defined by
fv(w) =
{
1 iff 〈v,w〉
0 otherwise
Roughly speaking, in a ciphertext, all sub-attributes (in Zm) are blinded by the same uniformly random
“blinding” element b ¶. The decryption algorithmmultiplies each component by the corresponding component
in the predicate vector, and the blinding element b is eliminated when the inner product evaluates to zero
with all but negligible probability, which allows decryption to proceed.
Let c1 and c2 be ciphertexts that encrypt attributes a1 and a2 respectively. It can be easily shown that
the sum c′ = c1⊞
‖ c2 encrypts both a1 and a2 in a somewhat “isolated” way. The lossiness is “hidden”
by the negligible probability of two non-zero inner-products summing to 0. For linear aggregation, this can
be repeated a polynomial number of times (or effectively unbounded in practice) while ensuring correctness
with overwhelming probability. While linear aggregation is sufficient for the WSN scenario, it is interesting
to explore other circuit forms. For the KSW scheme, we observe that all circuits of polynomial depth can be
evaluated with overwhelming probability. For AFV, the picture is somewhat similar to the fully homomorphic
schemes based on LWE such as [4, 5] but without requiring multiplicative gates.
While there are motivating scenarios for aggregation on the attributes, in many cases it is adequate or
preferable to restrict evaluation to ciphertexts with matching attributes; that is, by means of the δ operation
defined in Section 3.3. Among these cases is anonymous IBE. In the next section, we introduce an IBE
construction that supports an unbounded XOR homomorphism, prove that it is strongly homomorphic and
then investigate anonymous variants.
5 Main Construction: XOR-Homomorphic IBE
In this section, an XOR-homomorphic IBE scheme is presented whose security is based on the quadratic
residuosity assumption. Therefore, it is similar in many respects to the Goldwasser-Micali (GM) cryptosys-
tem [6], which is well-known to be XOR-homomorphic. Indeed, the GM scheme has found many practical
applications due to its homomorphic property. In Section 6.3, we show how many of these applications benefit
from an XOR-homomorphic scheme in the identity-based setting.
Our construction derives from the IBE scheme due to Cocks [27] which has a security reduction to the
quadratic residuosity problem. To the best of our knowledge, a homomorphic variant has not been explored
to date.
§In [9], m is a product of three large primes and n is the security parameter. In [36], n is independent of the
security parameter and m may be polynomial or superpolynomial in the security parameter; in the latter case m is
the product of many “small” primes. We require that m be superpolynomial here.
¶a scalar in KSW and a matrix in AFV
‖⊞ denotes a pairwise sum of the ciphertext components in both schemes
5.1 Background
Let m be an integer. A quadratic residue in the residue ring Zm is an integer x such that x ≡ y2 mod m
for some y ∈ Zm. The set of quadratic residues in Zm is denoted QR(m). If m is prime, it easy to determine
whether any x ∈ Zm is a quadratic residue.
Let N = pq be a composite modulus where p and q are prime. Let x ∈ Z. We write
(
x
N
)
to denote
the Jacobi symbol of x mod N . The subset of integers with Jacobi symbol +1 (resp. -1) is denoted ZN [+1]
(resp. ZN [−1]). The quadratic residuosity problem is to determine, given input (N, x ∈ ZN [+1]), whether
x ∈ QR(N), and it is believed to be intractable.
Define the encoding ν : {0, 1} → {−1, 1} with ν(0) = 1 and ν(1) = −1. Formally, ν is a group isomorphism
between (Z2,+) and ({−1, 1}, ∗).
In this section, we build on the results of [25] and therefore attempt to maintain consistency with their
notation where possible. As in [25], we let H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗N [+1] be a full-domain hash. A message bit is
mapped to an element of {−1, 1} via ν as defined earlier (0 (1 resp.) is encoded as 1 (-1 resp.)).
5.2 Original Cocks IBE Scheme
− CocksIBE.Setup(1λ):
1. Repeat: p, q
$←− RandPrime(1λ) Until: p ≡ q ≡ 3 (mod 4)
2. N ← pq
3. Output (PP := N,MSK := (p, q))
− CocksIBE.KeyGen(PP,MSK, id):
1. Parse MSK as (p, q).
2. a← H(id)
3. r ← aN+5−p−q8 (mod N)
(∴ r2 ≡ a (mod N) or r2 ≡ −a (mod N))
4. Output skid := (id, r)
− CocksIBE.Encrypt(PP, id, b):
1. a← H(id)
2. t1, t2
$←− Z∗N [ν(b)]
3. Output ψ := (t1 + at
−1
1 , t2 − at−12 )− CocksIBE.Decrypt(PP, skid, ψ):
1. Parse ψ as (ψ1, ψ2)
2. Parse skid as (id, r)
3. a← H(id)
4. If r2 ≡ a (mod N), set d← ψ1. Else if r2 ≡ −a (mod N), set d← ψ2. Else output ⊥ and abort.
5. Output ν−1(
(
d+ 2r
N
)
)
The above scheme can be shown to be adaptively secure in the random oracle model assuming the
hardness of the quadratic residuosity problem.
Anonymity Cocks’ scheme is not anonymous. Boneh et al. [37] report a test due to Galbraith that enables
an attacker to distinguish the identity of a ciphertext. This is achieved with overwhelming probability given
multiple ciphertexts. It is shown by Ateniese and Gasti [25] that there is no “better” test for attacking
anonymity. Briefly, let a = H(id) be the public key derived from the identity IDa. Let c be a ciphertext in
the Cocks’ scheme. Galbraith’s test is defined as
GT(a, c,N) =
(
c2 − 4a
N
)
Now if c is a ciphertext encrypted with a, then GT(a, c,N) = +1 with all but negligible probability. For
b ∈ Z∗N such that b 6= a, the value GT(b, c,N) is statistically close to the uniform distribution on {−1, 1}.
Therefore, given multiple ciphertexts, it can be determined with overwhelming probability whether they
correspond to a particular identity.
5.3 XOR-homomorphic Construction
Recall that a ciphertext in the Cocks scheme consists of two elements in ZN . Thus, we have
(c, d)← CocksIBE.Encrypt(PP, id, b) ∈ Z2N
for some identity id and bit b ∈ {0, 1}. Also recall that only one element is actually used for decryption
depending on whether a := H(id) ∈ QR(N) or −a ∈ QR(N). If the former holds, it follows that a decryptor
has a secret key r satisfying r2 ≡ a (mod N). Otherwise, a secret key r satisfies r2 ≡ −a (mod N). To
simplify the description of the homomorphic property, we will assume that a ∈ QR(N) and therefore omit
the second “component” d from the ciphertext. In fact, the properties hold analogously for the second
“component” by simply replacing a with −a.
In the homomorphic scheme, each “component” of the ciphertext is represented by a pair of elements in
Z2N instead of a single element as in the original Cocks scheme. As mentioned, we will omit the second such
pair for the moment. Consider the following encryption algorithm Ea defined by
Ea(b : {0, 1}) :
t
$←− Z∗N [ν(b)]
return (t+ at−1, 2) ∈ Z2N .
Furthermore, define the decryption function Da(c) = ν
−1(c0 + rc1). The homomorphic operation ⊞ : Z
2
N ×
Z2N → Z2N is defined as follows:
c⊞ d = (c0d0 + ac1d1, c0d1 + c1d0) (5.1)
It is easy to see that Da(c⊞ d) = Da(c)⊕Da(d):
Da(c⊞ d) = Da((c0d0 + ac1d1, c0d1 + c1d0))
= ν−1((c0d0 + ac1d1) + r(c0d1 + c1d0))
= ν−1(c0d0 + rc0d1 + rc1d0 + r
2c1d1)
= ν−1((c0 + rc1)(d0 + rd1))
= ν−1(c0 + rc1)⊕ ν−1(d0 + rd1)
= Da(c)⊕Da(d) (5.2)
Let Ra = ZN [x]/(x
2 − a) be a quotient of the polynomial ring R = ZN [x]. It is more natural and
convenient to view ciphertexts as elements of Ra and the homomorphic operation as multiplication in Ra.
Furthermore, decryption equates to evaluation at the point r. Thus the homomorphic evaluation of two
ciphertext polynomials c(x) and d(x) is simply e(x) = c(x) ∗ d(x) where ∗ denotes multiplication in Ra.
Decryption becomes ν−1(e(r)). Moreover, Galbraith’s test is generalized straightforwardly to the ring Ra:
GT(a, c(x)) =
(
c20 − c21a
N
)
.
We now formally describe our variant of the Cocks scheme that supports an XOR homomorphism.
Remark 4. We have presented the scheme in accordance with Definition 4 for consistency with the rest of
the paper. Therefore, it uses the circuit formulation, which we would typically consider superfluous for a
group homomorphic scheme.
Let C , {x 7→ 〈t,x〉 : t ∈ Zℓ2} ⊂ Zℓ2 → Z2 be the class of arithmetic circuits characterized by linear
functions over Z2 in ℓ variables. As such, we associate a representative vector V (C) ∈ Zℓ2 to every circuit
C ∈ C. In order to obtain a strongly homomorphic scheme, we use the standard technique of re-randomizing
the evaluated ciphertext by homomorphically adding an encryption of zero.
− xhIBE.Encrypt(PP, id, b):
1. a← H(id)
2. As a subroutine (used later), define
E(PP, a, b):
(a) t1, t2
$←− Z∗N [ν(b)]
(b) g1, g2
$←− Z∗N
(c) c(x)← (t1 + ag21t−11 ) + 2g1x ∈ ZN [x]
(d) d(x)← (t2 + ag22t−12 ) + 2g2x ∈ ZN [x]
(e) Repeat steps (a) - (d) until GT(a, c(x)) = 1 and GT(−a, d(x)) = 1.
(f) Output (c(x), d(x))
3. Output ψ := (E(PP, a, b), a)
− xhIBE.Decrypt(PP, skid, ψ):
1. Parse ψ as (c(x), d(x), a)
2. Parse skid as (id, r)
3. If r2 ≡ a (mod N) and GT(a, c(x)) = 1, set e(x)← c(x). Else if r2 ≡ −a (mod N) and GT(−a, c(x)) =
1, set e(x)← d(x). Else output ⊥ and abort.
4. Output ν−1(
(
e(r)
N
)
)
xhIBE.Eval(PP, C, ψ1, . . . , ψℓ):
1. Parse ψi as (ci(x), di(x), ai) for 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ
2. If ai 6= aj for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ ℓ, abort with ⊥.
3. Let a = a1 and let Ra = ZN [x]/(x
2 − a)
4. v ← V (C)
5. J ← {1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ : vi = 1}
6. (c′(x), d′(x))← (∏i∈J ci(x) mod (x2 − a),∏i∈I di(x)) mod (x2 + a)
7. (cz(x), dz(x))← E(PP, a, 0) (E is defined as a subroutine in the specification of xhIBE.Encrypt)
8. Output (c′(x) ∗ cz(x) mod (x2 − a), d′(x) ∗ dz(x) mod (x2 + a), a).
We now prove that our scheme is group homomorphic and strongly homomorphic. A formalization of
group homomorphic public-key schemes is given in [38]. Our adapted definition for the PE setting raises some
subtle points. The third requirement in [38] is more difficult to formalize for general PE; we omit it from
the definition here and leave a complete formalization to Appendix A. We remark that this property which
relates to distinguishing “illegitimate ciphertexts” during decryption is not necessary to achieve IND-ID-CPA
security.
Definition 7 (Adapted from Definition 1 in [38]). Let E = (G,K,E,D) be a PE scheme with message
space M , attribute space A, ciphertext space Cˆ and class of predicates F . The scheme E is group homomorphic
with respect to a non-empty set of attributes A′ ⊆ A if for every (PP,MSK) ← G(1λ), every f ∈ F : A′ ⊆
supp(f), and every skf ← K(MSK, f), the message space (M, ·) is a non-trivial group, and there is a binary
operation ⊡ : Cˆ2 → Cˆ such that the following properties are satisfied for the restricted ciphertext space
Cˆf = {c ∈ Cˆ : Dskf (c) 6= ⊥}:
1. The set of all encryptions C := {c ∈ Cˆf | c ← E(PP, a,m), a ∈ A′,m ∈ M} under attributes in A′ is a
non-trivial group under the operation ⊡.
2. The restricted decryption D∗skf := Dskf |C is surjective and ∀c, c′ ∈ C Dskf (c⊡ c′) = Dskf (c) ·Dskf (c′).
3. IBE only (generalized in Appendix A) If E is an IBE scheme, then Cˆf is also required to be a group,
and it is required to be computationally indistinguishable from C; that is:
{(PP, f, skf , S, c) | c $←− C, S ⊂ {skg ← K(g) : g ∈ F}} ≈
C
{(PP, f, skf , S, cˆ) | cˆ $←− Cˆf , S ⊂ {skg ← K(g) : g ∈ F}}.
Informally, the above definition is telling us that for a given subset of attributes A′ satisfying a predicate
f , the set of honestly generated encryptions under these attributes forms a group that is epimorphic to
the plaintext group. It does not say anything about ciphertexts that are not honestly generated except in
the case of IBE, where we require that all ciphertexts that do not decrypt to ⊥ under a secret key are
indistinguishable.
For the remainder of this section, we show that xhIBE fulfills the definition of a group homomorphic
scheme, and that it is IND-ID-CPA secure under the quadratic residuosity assumption in the random oracle
model. To simplify the presentation of the proofs, additional notation is needed. In particular, we inherit the
notation from [25], and generalize it to the ring Ra.
Define the subset Ga ⊂ Ra as follows:
Ga = {c(x) ∈ Ra : GT(a, c(x)) = 1}
Define the subset Sa ⊂ Ga∗∗:
Sa = {2hx+ (t+ ah2t−1) ∈ Ga | h ∈ ZN , t, (t+ ah2t−1) ∈ Z∗N}
We have the following simple lemma:
Lemma 1.
1. (Ga, ∗) is a multiplicative group in Ra.
2. (Sa, ∗) is a subgroup of Ga
Proof. We must show that Ga is closed under ∗. Let c(x), d(x) ∈ Ga, and let e(x) = c(x) ∗ d(x).
GT(a, e(x)) =
(
e20 − ae21
N
)
=
(
(c0d0 + ac1d1)
2 − a(c0d1 + c1d0)2
N
)
=
(
(c20 − ac21)(d20 − ad21)
N
)
=
(
(c20 − ac21)
N
)(
(d20 − ad21)
N
)
= GT(a, c(x)) · GT(a, d(x))
= 1
Therefore, e(x) ∈ Ga.
It remains to show that every element of Ga is a unit. Let z = c
2
0 − ac21 ∈ ZN . An inverse d1x + d0 of
c(x) can be computed by setting d0 =
c0
z
and d1 =
−c1
z
if it holds that z is invertible in ZN . Indeed such a
d1x+ d0 is in Ga. Now if z is not invertible in ZN then p|z or q|z, which implies that
(
z
p
)
= 0 or
(
z
q
)
= 0.
But GT(a, c(x)) =
(
z
N
)
=
(
z
p
)(
z
q
)
= 1 since c(x) ∈ Ga. Therefore, z is a unit in ZN , and c(x) is a unit in
Ga.
Finally, to prove (2), note that the members of Sa are exactly the elements c(x) such that c
2
0 − c21a is a
square, and it is easy to see that this is preserved under ∗ in Ra. ⊓⊔
We will also need the following corollary
Corollary 2 (Extension of Lemma 2.2 in [25]). The distributions {(N, a, t + ah2t−1, 2h) : N ←
Setup(1λ), a
$←− Z∗N [+1], t, h $←− Z∗N )} and {(N, a, z0, z1) : N ← Setup(1λ), a $←− Z∗N [+1], z0 + z1x $←− Ga \ Sa}
are indistinguishable assuming the hardness of the quadratic residuosity problem.
Proof. The corollary follows immediately from Lemma 2.2 in [25] Let A be an efficient adversary that
distinguishes both distributions. Lemma 2.2 in [25] shows that the distributions d0 := ({(N, a, t+at−1) : N ←
Setup(1λ), a
$←− Z∗N [+1], t} and d1 := {(N, a, z0) : N ← Setup(1λ), a $←− Z∗N [+1], z1x+ z0 $←− Ga \ Sa | z2 = 2}
are indistinguishable. Given a sample (N, a, c), the simulator generates h
$←− Z∗N and computes b := h−2a. It
passes the element (N, b, c, 2h) to A. The simulator aborts with the output of A. ⊓⊔
Theorem 1. xhIBE is a group homomorphic scheme with respect to the group operation of (Z2,+).
∗∗This definition is stricter than its analog in [25] in that all elements are in Ga. This definition here corrects an
error in [39] where h ∈ Z∗N instead of h ∈ ZN .
Proof. Let a = H(id) for any valid identity string id. Assume that the secret key r satisfies r2 ≡ a mod N .
The analysis holds analogously if r2 ≡ −a mod N ; therefore, we omit the second component of the cipher-
texts for simplicity.
By definition, Sa = {c(x) ∈ Ra | ψ := (c(x), d(x), a) ← xhIBE.Encrypt(PP, id,m),m ∈ M}. By corollary
2, it holds that Sa ≈
C
Ga without the master secret key. The decryption algorithm only outputs ⊥ on input
ψ := (c(x), d(x), a) if c(x) /∈ Ga or d(x) /∈ G−a. Thus, omitting the second component, we have that Sa
corresponds to C and Ga corresponds to Cˆf in Definition 7 (in this case f is defined as f(id′) = 1 iff id′ = id).
It follows that the third requirement of Definition 7 is satisfied.
By Lemma 1, Ga is a group and Sa is a non-trivial subgroup of Ga. The surjective homomorphism
between C := Sa and M := Z∗2 has already been shown in the correctness derivation in equation 5.2. This
completes the proof. ⊓⊔
Remark 5. It is straightforward to show that xhIBE also meets the criteria for a shift-type homomorphism
as defined in [38].
Corollary 3. xhIBE is strongly homomorphic.
Proof. Any group homomorphic scheme can be turned into a strongly homomorphic scheme by rerandom-
izing an evaluated ciphertext. Indeed this follows from Lemma 1 in [38]. Rerandomization is achieved by
multiplying the evaluated ciphertext by an encryption of the identity, as in xhIBE.Eval. Details follow for
completeness.
Let id be an identity and let a = H(id). For any circuit C ∈ C, any messages b1, . . . , bℓ and ciphertexts
ψ1, . . . , ψℓ ← xhIBE.Encrypt(PP, b1, id), . . . , xhIBE.Encrypt(PP, bℓ, id), we have
(c′(x), d′(x), a)← xhIBE.Eval(PP, C, ψ1, . . . , ψℓ).
From the last step of xhIBE.Eval, we see that c′(x)← c′′(x) ∗ r(x) where r(x) $←− Sa(0) and c′′(x) is the result
of the homomorphic evaluation. Suppose that c′′(x) encrypts a bit b. Since Sa is a group, it follows that
c′(x) is uniformly distributed in the coset S
(b)
a (of the subgroup S
(0)
a ) and is thus distributed according to a
“fresh” encryption of b. ⊓⊔
Theorem 2. xhIBE is IND-ID-CPA secure in the random oracle model under the quadratic residuosity
assumption.
Proof. Let A be an adversary that breaks the IND-ID-CPA security of xhIBE. We use A to construct an
algorithm S to break the IND-ID-CPA security of the Cocks scheme with the same advantage. S proceeds
as follows:
1. Uniformly sample an element h
$←− Z∗N . Receive the public parameters PP from the challenger C and pass
them to A.
2. S answers a query to H for identity id with H ′(id) · h−2 where H ′ is S’s random oracle. The responses
are uniformly distributed in ZN [+1].
3. S answers a key generation query for id with the response K(id) · h−1 where K is its key generation
oracle.
4. When A chooses target identity id∗, S relays id∗ to C. Assume w.l.o.g that H has been queried for id,
and that A has not made a secret key query for id∗. Further key generation requests are handled subject
to the condition that id 6= id∗ for a requested identity id.
5. Let a = H(id∗). On receiving a challenge ciphertext (c, d) from C, compute c(x) ← 2hx + c ∈ R and
d(x) ← (2hx + d) ∗ r(x) ∈ R where r(x) $←− S(0)−a and S(0)−a is the second component of the set of legal
encryptions of 0. From corollary 3, d(x) is uniformly distributed in S
(b)
−a where the ciphertext (c, d) in
the Cocks scheme encrypts the bit b. It follows that (c(x), d(x)) is a perfectly simulated encryption of b
under identity id∗ in xhIBE. Give (c(x), d(x)) to A.
6. Output A’s guess b′.
Since the view of A in an interaction with S is indistinguishable from its view in the real game, we
conclude that the advantage of S is equal to the advantage of A.
⊓⊔
In the next section, attention is drawn to obtaining an anonymous variant of our construction.
6 Anonymity
Cocks’ scheme is notable as one of the few IBE schemes that do not rely on pairings. Since it appeared, there
have been efforts to reduce its ciphertext size and make it anonymous. Boneh, Gentry and Hamburg [28]
proposed a scheme with some elegant ideas that achieves both anonymity and a much reduced ciphertext size
for multi-bit messages at the expense of performance, which is O(n4) for encryption and O(n3) for decryption
(where n is the security parameter). Unfortunately the homomorphic property is lost in this construction.
As mentioned earlier (cf. Section 5.2), another approach due to Ateniese and Gasti [25] achieves anonymity
and preserves performance, but its per-bit ciphertext expansion is much higher than in [28]. However, an
advantage of this scheme is that it is universally anonymous (anyone can anonymize the message, not merely
the encryptor [24]).
On the downside, anonymizing according to this scheme breaks the homomorphic property of our con-
struction, which depends crucially on the public key a. More precisely, what is forfeited is the universal
homomorphic property mentioned in the introduction (i.e. anyone can evaluate on the ciphertexts without
additional information). There are applications where an evaluator is aware of the attribute(s) associated
with ciphertexts, but anonymity is desirable to prevent any other parties in the system learning about such
attributes. This motivates a variant of HPE, which we call non-universal HPE, denoted by HPEU¯ .
6.1 Non-Universal HPE
Motivation “Non-universal” homomorphic encryption is proposed for schemes that support attribute pri-
vacy but require some information that is derivable from the public key (or attribute in the case of PE) in
order to perform homomorphic evaluation. Therefore, attribute privacy must be surrendered to an evalua-
tor. If this is acceptable for an application, while at the same time there is a requirement to hide the target
recipient(s) from other entities in the system, then “non-universal” homomorphic encryption may be useful.
Consider the following informal scenario. Suppose a collection of parties P1, . . . , Pℓ outsource a computation
on their encrypted data sets to an untrusted remote server S. Suppose S sends the result (encrypted) to an
independent database DB from which users can retrieve the encrypted records. For privacy reasons, it may
be desirable to limit the information that DB can learn about the attributes associated with the ciphertexts
retrieved by certain users. Therefore, it may desirable for the encryption scheme to provide attribute privacy.
However, given the asymmetric relationship between the delegators P1, . . . , Pℓ and the target recipient(s), it
might be acceptable for S to learn the target attribute(s) provided there is no collusion between S and DB.
In fact, the delegators may belong to a different organization than the recipient(s).
In this paper, we introduce a syntax and security model for non-universal homomorphic IBE. The main
change in syntax entails an additional input α that is supplied to the Eval algorithm. The input α ∈
{0, 1}d (where d = poly(λ)) models the additional information needed to compute the homomorphism(s).
A description of an efficient map QA : A → {0, 1}d is included in the public parameters. We say that two
attributes(i.e. identities in IBE) a1, a2 ∈ A satisfying QA(a1) = QA(a2) belong to the same attribute class.
One reason that the proposed syntax is not general enough for arbitrary PE functionalities is that it
only facilitates evaluation on ciphertexts whose attributes are in the same attribute class, which suffices for
(relatively) simple functionalities such as IBE.
We now formulate the security notion of attribute-hiding for non-universal homomorphic IBE. Our secu-
rity model provides the adversary with an evaluation oracle whose identity-dependent input α is fixed when
the challenge is produced. Accordingly, for a challenge identity id ∈ A, and binary string α = QA(id) ∈
{0, 1}d, the adversary can query IBEU¯.Eval(PP, α, ·, ·) for any circuit in C and any ℓ-length sequence of
ciphertexts.
Formally, consider the experiment
Experiment U¯Priv(A1,A2)
††
(PP,MSK)← IBE.Setup(1λ)
(id0,m0), (id1,m1), σ ← AIBEU¯.KeyGen(MSK,·)1 (PP) ⊲ σ denotes the adversary’s state
b
$←− {0, 1}
††In the random oracle model, the adversary is additionally given access to a random oracle. This is what the
results in this paper will use.
α← QA(idb)
c← IBE.Encrypt(PP, idb,mb)
b′ ← AIBEU¯.KeyGen∗(MSK,·),IBEU¯.Eval(PP,α,·,·)2 (PP, c, σ)
return 1 iff b′ = b and 0 otherwise.
Define the advantage of an adversary A := (A1,A2) in the above experiment for a IBEU¯ scheme E as
follows:
AdvU¯PrivE (A) = Pr
[
U¯Priv(A)⇒ 1]− 1
2
.
A IBEU¯ scheme E is said to be attribute-hiding if for all pairs of PPT algorithms A := (A1,A2), it holds
that AdvU¯PrivE (A) ≤ negl(λ). Note that the above definition assumes adaptive adversaries, but can be easily
modified to accommodate the non-adaptive case.
6.2 Universal Anonymizers
We now present an abstraction called a universal anonymizer. With its help, we can transform a universally-
homomorphic, non-attribute-hiding IBE scheme E into a non-universally homomorphic, attribute-hiding
scheme E ′. In accordance with the property of universal anonymity proposed in [24], any party can anonymize
a given ciphertext.
Let E := (Setup,KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt,Eval) be a PE scheme parameterized with message space M ,
attribute space A, class of predicates F , and class of circuits C. Denote its ciphertext space by C. Note that
this definition of a universal anonymizer only suffices for simple functionalities such as IBE.
Definition 8. A universal anonymizer UE for a PE scheme E is a tuple (G,B,B−1, QA, QF) where G is a
deterministic algorithm, B and B−1 are randomized algorithms, and QA and QF are efficient maps, defined
as follows:
− G(PP):
On input the public parameter of an instance of E, output a parameters structure params. This contains
a description of a modified ciphertext space Cˆ as well as an integer d = poly(λ) indicating the length of
binary strings representing an attribute class.
− B(params, c):
On input parameters params and a ciphertext c ∈ C, output an element of Cˆ.
− B−1(params, α, cˆ):
On input parameters params, a binary string α ∈ {0, 1}d and an element of Cˆ, output an element of C.
− Both maps QA and QF are indexed by params: QAparams : A→ {0, 1}d and QF params : F → {0, 1}d.
Note: params can be assumed to be an implicit input; it will not be explicitly specified to simplify notation.
The binary string α is computed by means of a map QA : A → {0, 1}d. In order for a decryptor to
invert B, α must also be computable from any predicate that is satisfied by an attribute that maps onto α.
Therefore, the map QF : F → {0, 1}d has the property that for all a ∈ A and f ∈ F :
f(a) = 1⇒ QA(a) = QF(f).
We define an equivalence relation ∼ on F given by
f1 ∼ f2 , QF(f1) = QF (f2).
We have that
f ∼ g ⇐⇒ ∃h1, . . . , hk ∈ F supp(f) ∩ supp(h1) 6= ∅ ∧ . . . ∧ supp(hk) ∩ supp(g) 6= ∅.
It follows that each α is a representative of an equivalence class in F/ ∼. As a result, as mentioned earlier,
our definition of a universal anonymizer above is only meaningful for “simple” functionalities such as IBE.
For example, |F/ ∼ | = |F| for an IBE scheme whose ciphertexts leak the recipient’s identity.
Let c be a ciphertext associated with an attribute a. Let α = QA(a). Informally, c
′ := B−1(α,B(c))
should “behave” like c; that is, (1) it should have the same homomorphic “capacity” and (2) decryption
with a secret key for any f should have the same output as that for c. A stronger requirement captured in
our formal correctness criterion defined Appendix B is that c and c′ should be indistinguishable even when
a distinguisher is given access to MSK.
A universal anonymizer is employed in the following generic transformation from a universally-homomorphic,
non-attribute-hiding IBE scheme E to a non-universally homomorphic, attribute-hiding scheme E ′.
The transformation is achieved by setting:
− E ′.Encrypt(PP, a,m) :=
B(E .Encrypt(PP, a,m))
− E ′.Decrypt(SKf , c) :=
E .Decrypt(SKf ,B−1(QF(f), c))
− E ′.Eval(PP, α, C, c1, . . . , cℓ) :=
return B(E .Eval(PP, C,B−1(α, c1), . . . ,B−1(α, cℓ)))
Denote the above transformation by TUE (E). We leave to future work the task of establishing (generic)
sufficient conditions that E must satisfy to ensure that E ′ := TUE (E) is an attribute-hiding HPEU¯ scheme.
An instantiation of a universal anonymizer for our XOR homomorphic scheme is given in Appendix C.
6.3 Applications (Brief Overview)
It turns out that XOR-homomorphic cryptosystems have been considered to play an important part in several
applications. The most well-known and widely-used unbounded XOR-homomorphic public-key cryptosystem
is Goldwasser-Micali (GM) [6], which is based on the quadratic residuosity problem. Besides being used in
protocols such as private information retrieval (PIR), GM has been employed in some specific applications
such as:
− Peng, Boyd and Dawson (PBD) [40] propose a sealed-bid auction system that makes extensive use of
the GM cryptosystem.
− Bringer et al. [41] apply GM to biometric authentication. It is used in two primary ways; (1) to achieve
PIR and (2) to assist in computing the hamming distance between a recorded biometric template and a
reference one.
Perhaps in some of these applications, a group-homomorphic identity-based scheme may be of import,
although the authors concede that no specific usage scenario has been identified so far.
With regard to performance, our construction requires 8 multiplications in ZN for a single homomorphic
operation in comparison to a single multiplication in GM. Furthermore, the construction has higher ciphertext
expansion than GM by a factor of 4. Encryption involves 2 modular inverses and 6 multiplications (only 4
if the strongly homomorphic property is forfeited). In comparison, GM only requires 1.5 multiplications on
average.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
We have presented a characterization of homomorphic encryption in the PE setting and classified schemes
based on the properties of their attribute homomorphisms. Instantiations of certain homomorphic properties
were presented for inner-product PE. However, it is clear that meaningful attribute homomorphisms are
limited. We leave to future work the exploration of homomorphic encryption with access policies in a more
general setting .
In this paper, we introduced a new XOR-homomorphic variant of the Cocks’ IBE scheme and showed that
it is strongly homomorphic. However, we failed to fully preserve the homomorphic property in anonymous
variants; that is, we could not construct an anonymous universally-homomorphic variant. We leave this as
an open problem. As a compromise, however, a weaker primitive (non-universal IBE) was introduced along
with a related security notion. Furthermore, a transformation strategy adapted from the work of Ateniese
and Gasti [25] was exploited to obtain anonymity for our XOR-homomorphic construction in this weaker
primitive.
In future work, it is hoped to construct other group homomorphic IBE schemes, and possibly for more
general classes of predicates than the IBE functionality.
Noteworthy problems, which we believe are still open:
1. Somewhat-homomorphic IBE scheme (even non-adaptive security in the ROM)
2. (Unbounded) Group homomorphic IBE schemes for (Zm,+) where m = O(2
λ) and (Z∗p, ∗) for prime p.
Extensions include anonymity and support for a wider class of predicates beyond the IBE functionality.
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A Group-Homomorphic Encryption Generalized for PE
Definition 9 (Extension of Definition 7). Let E = (G,K,E,D) be a PE scheme with message space M , attribute
space A, ciphertext space Cˆ and class of predicates F. The scheme E is group homomorphic if for every (PP,MSK)←
G(1λ), every f ∈ F : supp(f) 6= ∅, and every skf ← K(MSK, f), the message space (M, ·) is a non-trivial group, and
there is a binary operation ∗ : Cˆ2 → Cˆ such that the following properties are satisfied for the restricted ciphertext space
Cˆf = {c ∈ Cˆ : Dskf (c) 6= ⊥}:
1. (Cˆf , ∗) is a non-trivial group.
2. The set of all encryptions Cf = {c ∈ Cˆf | c← E(PP, a,m), a ∈ supp(f), m ∈ M} is a subgroup of Cˆf with respect
to the operation ∗.
3. The restricted decryption D∗skf := Dskf |Cˆf is surjective and ∀c, c
′ ∈ Cˆf Dskf (c ∗ c
′) = Dskf (c) ·Dskf (c
′).
4. The following distributions are computationally indistinguishable:
{(PP, f, skf , S, c) | c
$
←− Cf , S ⊂ {skg ← K(g) : g ∈ F}} ≈
C
{(PP, f, skf , S, cˆ) | cˆ
$
←− Cˆf , S ⊂ {skg ← K(g) : g ∈ F}}.
5. There is an efficient function τ : A→ F such that for any a ∈ A, f = τ (a) satisfies
g(a′) = g(a) for all a′ ∈ supp(f), g ∈ F .
Armknecht, Katzenbeisser and Peter give a characterization of group-homomorphic public key cryptosystems [22].
Their characterization includes the condition that the secret key contain an efficient predicate, or decision function,
δ : Cˆ → {0, 1} satisfying
δ(c) = 1 ⇐⇒ c ∈ C
where Cˆ denotes the ciphertext space and C ⊆ Cˆ denotes the set of legally-generated ciphertexts under the public key
(i.e. the image of the encryption algorithm over all messages and random coins). Now generalizing this to PE in the
above definition yields a decision function δf : Cˆ → {0, 1} with
δf (c) = 1 ⇐⇒ c ∈ Cf .
We can show that such a decision function does not always exist. A counterexample is our XOR-homomorphic IBE
system from Section 5. Let a = H(id) and for some identity id. Let f : A → {0, 1} be the point function that is
nonzero at exactly id ∈ A. Then Cf corresponds to {(c(x), d(x), a) : c(x) ∈ Sa, d(x) ∈ S−a} and Cˆf corresponds to
{(c(x), d(x), a) : c(x) ∈ Ga, d(x) ∈ G−a}. However, there is no efficient distinguisher that can distinguish between Sa
and Ga (or S−a and G−a) without access to the factorization of N (i.e. the master secret key). It follows that there
is no efficient decision function. This necessitates property 3 in the above definition in order to extend the abstract
characterizations of IND-CCA1 security in [22] to the PE setting. Because of property 3, it suffices to define δf as
δf (c) = 1 ⇐⇒ c ∈ Cˆf . (A.1)
We also extend the notion of GIFT (Generic shIFt-Type) from Definition 3 in [22]. We defer the reader to this
paper for a formal definition of GIFT. Informally, a GIFT PE scheme satisfies the following:
− The public parameters PP contains information to determine a non-trivial, proper normal subgroup Nf for every
group Cf .
− It holds that for every f, g ∈ F , the systems of representatives Rf = Cf/Nf and Rf = Cg/Ng have the same
cardinality; that is, |Rf | = |Rg |.
− PP contains an efficient function ψ : F × M → Cˆ with the property that ψf = ψ(f, ·) for any f ∈ F is an
isomorphism between M and Rf .
− To encrypt a message m ∈M under attribute a ∈ A, an encryptor:
1. computes f ′ ← τ (a),
2. chooses a random n
$
←− Nf ′ ,
3. and outputs the ciphertext ψf ′(m) ∗ n ∈ Cf ′ .
− A secret key skf for predicate f ∈ F contains an efficient description of ψ
−1
f ◦ µf where µf : Cˆf →Rf such that
r = µ(c) is the unique representative with c = r ∗ n where n ∈ Nf .
A.1 Interactive Splitting Oracle-Assisted Subgroup Membership Problem (ISOAP)
Let G be a PPT algorithm that takes as input a security parameter λ and outputs a tuple (Gˆ, I,G, k) where Gˆ is a finite
semigroup, I is a set of indices and G and k are defined momentarily. Firstly, G is a family {(Gi,Ni,Ri)}i∈I where
Gi ⊆ Gˆ is a non-trivial group, Ni is a proper, non-trivial subgroup of Gi and Ri ⊂ Gi is a finite set of representatives
of Gi/Ni. It is required that |Ri| = |Rj | for all i, j ∈ I. Finally, k is efficient trapdoor information that allows us to
efficiently solve the splitting problem (SP) in any group Gi; that is, given some c ∈ Gi, the goal of SP is to find the
unique r ∈ Ri and n ∈ Ni such that c = r ∗ n. We let K be a PPT algorithm that uses k and takes an index i ∈ I
as input, and outputs a description of an efficient function σi : Gi → Ri × Ni. Such a function solves SP in Gi.For
brevity, we set K′ := Kk.
We define an interactive version of the problem SOAP from [22], which we refer to as ISOAP. This is a subgroup
membership problem relating to a group chosen by the adversary who in addition is granted access to a “splitting
oracle” for that group.
The game that defines ISOAP proceeds as follows. Prior to the challenge phase, the adversary is granted access
to a “splitting oracle” OGˆ,I,G,KSP that takes an index i ∈ I and an element c of Gˆ, and answers with ⊥ if c /∈ Gi;
otherwise, it answers with σi(c). In addition, the adversary is given access to another oracle O
Gˆ,I,G,K,Q
K1
in the first
phase which responds to a query for an index i ∈ I by storing i in a cache Q and returning K(i).
Then the adversary chooses a “challenge” group by specifying an index ind ∈ I subject to the condition that
Gind ∩ Gj = ∅ for every j ∈ Q. It receives a challenge element c
∗ ∈ Gind.
In the second phase, the adversary is given access to a more restricted oracle OGˆ,I,G,K,c
∗
K2
that when queried on
index i ∈ I, returns K(i) if c∗ /∈ Gi, and returns ⊥ otherwise.
Experiment ExpISOAP(A1,A2),G,K(λ):
1. (Gˆ, I,G, k)← G(λ). K′ := Kk.
2. s, ind← A
O
Gˆ,I,G,K′
SP
(·,·),O
Gˆ,I,G,K′,Q
K1
1 (Gˆ, I,G).
3. Choose b
$
←− {0, 1}. If b = 1: c∗
$
←− Gind. Otherwise, c
∗ $←− Nind.
4. b′ ← A
O
Gˆ,I,G,K′,c∗
K2
2 (Gˆ, I,G, s, c
∗)
5. Output 1 if b′ = b. Output 0 otherwise.
Theorem 3. Let E = (G,K,E,D) be a GIFT PE scheme. Then E is IND-AD-CCA1 secure if and only if ISOAP is
hard relative to an algorithm G′ that derives the tuple it outputs, namely (Cˆ,F ,G := {(Cˆf .Rf , Nˆf )}f∈F ,MSK), from
(PP,MSK)← G(λ) where Cˆf = Rf ∗ Nˆf for every f ∈ F.
Proof (sketch). The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 3 in [22].
Firstly, we show that the hardness of ISOAP implies the IND-AD-CCA1 security of E . Suppose ISOAP is hard. As-
sume that E is not IND-AD-CCA1 secure. Then there is an algorithm B that has a non-negligible advantage ǫ attacking
the IND-AD-CCA1 security of E . This algorithm can be used to construct an adversary AISOAP = (AISOAP1 ,A
ISOAP
2 )
that obtains an advantage of 1
2
ǫ against ISOAP. Now AISOAP1 can simulate PP and forward it to B. It handles a secret
key query for f ∈ F by querying its oracle OK1 . Furthermore, it handles a decryption query for (f, c) where f ∈ F
and c ∈ Cˆ by returning ⊥ if δf (c) = 0 (see the definition of δf in Equation A.1) and responding with ψ
−1
f (r) other-
wise, where (r, n) ← OSP(f, c). When B chooses a target attribute a
∗ and two messages (m0,m1), A
ISOAP
1 computes
its target index f∗ = τ (a∗) and forwards it to the ISOAP challenger. AISOAP2 derives an IND-AD-CCA1 challenge
ciphertext from its ISOAP challenge c∗ by choosing a random bit t
$
←− {0, 1} and computing c′ = ψf∗(mt) ∗ c
∗. It
hands c′ to B. AISOAP2 responds to secret key queries by using its oracle OK2 in a similar manner to A
ISOAP. Finally,
it outputs t ⊕ b′ where b′ is B’s guess. Now let b be the bit chosen by the ISOAP challenger. If b = 0, then c′ is
indistinguishable from a correctly distributed encryption of mt. It is indistinguishable due to property 3 in Definition
A since c′ ∈ Cˆf∗ whereas a legally-generated ciphertext lies within Cf∗ . Denote B’s advantage distinguishing both
cases by AdvIND−CTB,E . If b = 1, then c
′ is an encryption of a random element of M , which contains no information
about t, forcing B’s advantage to zero. Therefore, the overall advantage of AISOAP is AdvIND−CTB,E +
1
2
ǫ.
Now we prove the reverse direction. Suppose that E is IND-AD-CCA1 secure. Assume for the purpose of contra-
diction that there is an adversary AISOAP = (AISOAP1 ,A
ISOAP
2 ) whose advantage is α against ISOAP. We can use A
ISOAP
to construct an adversary B to attack the IND-AD-CCA1 security of E . Firstly, B derives Cˆ, F and G from PP and
passes them to AISOAP1 . It simulates OK1 by forwarding a query for f to its secret key oracle and responding with a
description of σf derived from the secret key skf it receives. It simulates a query to OSP for (f, c) by (1). querying its
decryption oracle for c to obtain m′; (2). computing r ← ψf (m
′) and n← r−1 ∗ c; and (3). responding with (r, n).
Let f∗ be the target index outputted by AISOAP1 . Subsequently, B chooses an attribute a
∗ ∈ supp(f∗) and forwards
a∗ as its challenge attribute. Furthermore, it chooses messages m0,m1
$
←−M and forwards them to its challenger who
responds with a challenge ciphertext c∗. Next B computes c′ ← c∗ ∗E(a∗,m0)
−1 ∗n′ where n′
$
←− Nf∗ and hands c
′ to
AISOAP2 . Let b
′ be the bit guessed by AISOAP. Then B outputs b′ as its guess. Recall how a ciphertext is generated by
the IND-AD-CCA1 challenger. Firstly, the challenger samples bit t
$
←− {0, 1}. Then the challenger computes f ← τ (a)
and sets c∗ := ψf (mt) ∗ n where n
$
←− Nf .It follows by definition of τ that Nf ⊆ Nf∗ . This immediately implies that
Rf = Rf∗ . If t = 0, then c
′ is distributed according to a uniformly random element from Nf∗ , which results in an
advantage of 1
2
α provided that AISOAP2 cannot distinguish between Cf and Cˆf (property 3 of Definition A). If t = 1,
then c′ is a uniform in Cˆf , and the advantage of B in this case is also
1
2
α provided that AISOAP2 cannot distinguish
between Cf and Cˆf . The overall advantage is therefore Adv
IND−CT
AISOAP
2
,E
+ α. ⊓⊔
B Correctness Condition for a Universal Anonymizer
Let E be a H(PE) scheme with public index, and let UE := (G,B,B
−1, QA, QF ) be a universal anonymizer for E .
Define the distributions D1 := {(PP,MSK, params, c) | (PP,MSK) ← E .Setup(1
λ), params ← G(PP), c
$
←− C} and
D2 := {(PP,MSK, params, c
′) | (PP,MSK) ← E .Setup(1λ), params ← G(PP), c
$
←− C, c′ ← B−1(QA(attr(c)),B(c))}
where attr(c) returns the attribute associated with c. The correctness condition for a universal anonymizer UE is that
D1 ≈
C
D2 (computationally indistinguishability).
C Instantiation of a Universal Anonymizer for Main Construction
The techniques from [25] can be employed to construct a universal anonymizer for xhIBE. In this paper, the basic
version of their construction is adapted.
Let L(λ) be the maximum bit-length of identities in xhIBE. A universal anonymizer AGxhIBE :=
(AGxhIBE.G,AGxhIBE.B,AGxhIBE.B
−1, QA := H,Qf := fid 7→ H(id))
for xhIBE based on the techniques of Ateniese and Gasti is given as follows:
Let Geom(p) be a geometric distribution with parameter p.
Algorithm 1 AGxhIBE.G(PP)
m← λ ⊲ λ can be derived from PP
params := (m, lgN) ⊲ (length of members of Cˆ is 2(m+ 1) · lgN bits, length of α)
return params
Let the set of valid ciphertexts C be defined as {(c(x), d(x), a) ∈ ZN [x]
2 × ZN : c(x) ∈ Ga, d(x) ∈ G−a}. Then for
any (PP,MSK)← xhIBE.Setup(1λ) and params← AGxhIBE.G(PP): the correctness condition in Appendix B is trivially
satisfied since ∀ψ := (c(x), d(x), a) ∈ C
ψ = AGxhIBE.B
−1(a,AGxhIBE.B(ψ))
We can apply the transformation
xhIBE
′ ← TAGxhIBE (xhIBE)
described in the last section to obtain a scheme xhIBE′. The scheme in [25] is shown to satisfy a security definition
(ANON-IND-ID-CPA) in the random oracle model that is stronger than the attribute-hiding definition for IBE in
the random oracle model. It can be easily shown with the help of Corollary 2 that xhIBE′ is an attribute-hiding HPEU¯
scheme for the IBE functionality supporting the group homomorphism (Z2,+).
Algorithm 2 AGxhIBE.B(params, ψ)
Parse params as (m,L)
Parse ψ as (c(x), d(x), a)
k1, k2
$
←− Geom( 1
2
)
k1 ← min(k1,m).
k2 ← min(k2,m).
t(x), v(x)
$
←− ZN [x]
z1(x)← c(x) + t(x)
z2(x)← d(x) + v(x)
for 1 ≤ i < k1 do
repeat
ti(x)
$
←− ZN [x]
until GT(a, z1(x)− ti(x),N) = −1
end for
tk1 ← t(x)
for 1 ≤ i < k2 do
repeat
vi(x)
$
←− ZN [x]
until GT(−a, z2(x)− vi(x),N) = −1
end for
vk2 ← v(x)
for k1 < i ≤ m do
ti(x)
$
←− ZN [x]
end for
for k2 < i ≤ m do
vi(x)
$
←− ZN [x]
end for
return ψˆ := ((z1(x), t1(x), . . . , tm(x)), (z2(x), v1(x), . . . , vm(x))) ∈ ZN [x]
2m+2
Algorithm 3 AGxhIBE.B−1(params, a, ψˆ)
Parse params as (m,L)
Parse ψˆ as ((z1(x), t1(x), . . . , tm(x)), (z2(x), v1(x), . . . , vm(x)))
i← 1
while GT(a, ti(x)− z1(x),N) 6= 1 do
i← i+ 1
end while
c(x)← ti(x)− z1(x)
i← 1
while GT(−a, vi(x)− z2(x), N) 6= 1 do
i← i+ 1
end while
d(x)← vi(x)− z2(x)
return (c(x), d(x), a)
